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Introduction
The starting point for any consideration of the implications of Brexit for 
devolution in relation to agriculture is that there are important differences 
between the territories (but also within them) in relation to farm 
structures and production, such as size of holdings, the balance between 
sectors such as livestock and cereals, and the proportion of marginal 
land/less favoured area. In general terms, Wales and Northern Ireland 
have the smallest number of holdings above 100ha, and the largest under 
50ha, with the reverse true for England and Scotland. Agriculture in 
Northern Ireland and Wales is predominantly grazing grassland and 
livestock based (especially dairy and sheep), with a high share of upland 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA). Scotland is more balanced with important 
crops and cereals production, and also intensive specialist pigs and 
poultry. Agriculture in the devolved territories tends to have a higher 
political salience, which is partly a function of its economic importance but 
cultural considerations also come into play. The agri-food sector in each 
of the territories is regarded as a crucial element of the ‘regional 
economy’ in terms of annual turnover, contribution to gross value added, 
and to employment (indeed agricultural employment is relatively higher 
as a proportion of the total in Wales/Northern Ireland than in 
England/Scotland). It also has been identified in strategy documents 
published by the devolved governments as a key driver in future 
economic development. High value added food processing is important 
both to Scotland's self-image and to the economy, e.g., ‘Scotch beef’. 
There also are important socio-cultural aspects, for example in 
maintaining rural areas, and helping to sustain Welsh culture and 
language. 
Migrant labour in the agri-food sector is important in all of the territories 
and the approaches to Brexit of the devolved institutions (reflected in 
stakeholder positions) tends to highlight the importance of continued 
access to labour from the EU and other countries (perhaps for example 
involving a new version of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme, 
SAWS). 
1. What are the implications of leaving the Common 
Agricultural Policy for the UK, UK farmers and the rural 
economy? 
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there are important variations in the relative importance of subsidies. 
While EU funding from the CAP has been of crucial importance to UK 
farmers generally, it is even more so to those in the territories. In 2015, 
nearly 40 per cent of CAP payments in the UK went to Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland combined. Direct payments in particular are crucial 
because of the predominance of livestock-based enterprises, especially in 
upland less favoured areas. Overall there is a much higher degree of 
dependence on CAP payments in Scotland, Wales and NI, than in England 
(and for the UK as a whole). It has been estimated that EU subsidies 
make up between 50 and 60 per cent of farm income in the UK as a 
whole. However it is estimated that 87 per cent of total farming income in 
Northern Ireland, 80 per cent in Wales, and three quarters of total income 
from farming in Scotland is contributed by CAP payments, indicating that 
EU funding is crucial to the viability of most farms and represents the 
difference between making at a profit and running at a loss.
In the Brexit referendum most of the elite political actors in relation to 
agriculture in the devolved territories were strong advocates for 
remaining in the EU (although not the Democratic Unionist Party in 
Northern Ireland and farmers themselves were divided). This reflected a 
conviction that the effects of Brexit for the economy in general, and for 
the agri-food sector in particular, are likely to be substantially adverse, if 
not a disaster. This position remains dominant, although there is now an 
emerging cautious optimism that the farming and rural sector can thrive 
post-Brexit, but only if the appropriate policy and regulatory  framework 
is put in place, both in terms of finance and flexibility. 
2. Are there particular challenges regarding the repatriation of 
agricultural policy from the EU in the light of the devolution 
settlement?
There is unlikely to be much friction across the UK on the broad vision for 
agricultural policy post-Brexit, which will focus on competitiveness and 
market orientation whilst providing public goods such as the protection of 
the environment through ‘proportionate’ regulation. Five main challenges 
can be identified. 
(a) The main political challenge in relation to Brexit is to 
repatriate agricultural policy in a way that retains some sort 
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the devolved territories substantial scope to adapt policy to 
their needs and priorities. 
In relation to devolution, agricultural policy – as a transferred (devolved) 
matter - reflects fundamental tensions between pressures for uniformity 
across the UK as a whole, and a desire for variation to reflect the different 
structures, economies, and political pressures of the territories. Within the 
EU the scope for divergence in the UK has been set by the overall 
framework of the CAP and its presumption in favour of level playing fields 
which, despite increasing scope for flexibility within the CAP, constrains 
the room for manoeuvre of the territories. With the removal of the CAP 
umbrella, the main danger for some lies in increasing divergence across 
the UK, while for others it relates to a re-centralisation in Westminster 
and Whitehall of vital powers over agriculture. 
There are likely to be important political challenges. Debates about Brexit 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are framed by broader political 
perspectives, for example whether it will spark another referendum on 
independence in Scotland, and its impacts on the political settlement in 
Northern Ireland. Variation in the complexion of party political 
responsibility for agriculture and rural affairs can be important. In 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, ministers in recent years have been drawn 
from nationalist parties (in Northern Ireland the agriculture ministry had 
been held by a Sinn Féin MLA for several years, until taken by the DUP 
after the 2016 election), contrasting with the conservative government in 
England and the Labour administration in Wales. The lessons of 
devolution in agriculture in Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1972 
indicate, unsurprisingly, that ‘unionist’ parties are more likely to cleave to 
an integrationist position, where political imperatives about “Britishness” 
limit the scope for variation; conversely nationalist parties that emphasise 
difference see devolved policy flexibility as a way of enhancing this. Sinn 
Féin in Northern Ireland complains, for example, that agriculture policy is 
an example of a policy area where the UK government puts British needs 
first and ignores the specific needs of Northern Ireland, especially the 
interdependence of the economies north and south.
(b) A second challenge is to strike an appropriate balance 
and division of responsibilities between UK frameworks and 
devolved flexibility. 
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(i) that there should be no attempt to use Brexit to re-centralise powers 
in agricultural policy at Westminster; (ii) they should have substantial 
input into, and influence over, any new UK wide policy framework, that 
will need to be collectively agreed rather than imposed, with appropriate 
independent dispute settlement procedures; and (iii) that within this there 
should be substantial scope for flexibility and variation in agricultural 
policy. In this context the devolved governments are vocal in their 
insistence that post-Brexit agricultural policy should remain fully devolved 
and not lead to a re-centralisation of control and functions at 
Westminster. 
There is an assumption in the devolved territories that there will need to 
be an overarching policy framework. However some are concerned, for 
example in the farmers unions’ that flexibility for the devolved institutions 
without an adequate UK framework could lead to unfair competition 
between farmers within the UK. There is thus support for some sort of 
common UK-wide policy that minimises unfair competition and protects 
free trade and level playing fields, while allowing some room for flexibility 
and differentiation to permit the devolved administrations to make 
decisions that are appropriate for their conditions and circumstances. 
Politically there is the possibility of friction between the devolved 
governments and stakeholders over which functions should be covered in 
the UK framework and which are exercised at the territorial level, thus 
opening up potentially substantial room for variation. This may be 
especially problematic in relation to variation in subsidy payments and in 
regulation. There has for example been talk in Welsh government circles 
about taking the opportunity provided by Brexit to forge a new distinct 
approach, and the development of a ‘made-in-Wales’ approach to farming 
in which policies and regulations can be ‘tailor-made’ for Wales' unique 
needs. It may be that governments put more emphasis on political 
independence and flexibility and the expense of developing UK-wide 
frameworks, especially if they regard these as unsuited to their own 
requirements. 
(c) A third challenge will relate to funding. 
A central aim in negotiations on the shape of post-Brexit agricultural 
policy, which is shared by all of the devolved institutions and by the 
farmers unions, is to try to ensure that the level of funding for the sector 
5will not be lower than that prevailing under EU membership. This is 
viewed as especially important not only because of the relative 
importance to farm incomes but also because farmers in EU member 
states will continue to receive substantial subsidies, even if these might 
be somewhat lower after the next revision of the CAP for the period after 
2020. 
Of course there are also big questions about what any continuing funding 
will be used for. The UK Treasury is a long-standing critic of CAP 
subsidies, especially direct payments. On this basis, it is unlikely that a 
general subsidy will be maintained in the longer term. On the other hand 
the devolved governments and farmers organisations like direct payments 
and advocate their retention. Critics of agricultural policy under the CAP 
argue that funding should support public goods provision in areas such as 
the environment, climate change and rural development, and some 
movement in this direction is likely, and certainly towards a more 
‘integrated’ approach. Some sort of payments for both marginal farms 
and ecosystem services (agreed environmental and land management 
objectives such as supporting valued habitats and afforestation) are likely 
to be adopted, and are especially valuable for upland farmers. 
While the Treasury has pledged to maintain the current level of CAP 
funding until 2020, how this will be disbursed is unclear, whether via the 
Barnett Formula or through some other arrangement involving ‘topping-
up’. There is concern that if funding after 2020 is calculated on a per 
capita basis (such as using the Barnett formula), then the level of 
subsidies to farmers would be substantially reduced (for example 
Scotland’s population is about 8 per cent of the UK total, but Scottish 
farmers receive 18 per cent of the UK’s CAP funding). If subsidies are to 
be continued, even at a lower level, then the arrangements for funding 
them will be crucial and likely to provide a source of tension. For example 
if agriculture was to be funded through the mechanisms of the Barnett 
formula, then this would result in a substantial reduction of funding in the 
territories, where receipts from the CAP are significantly above the 
‘Barnett share’. Consequently the devolved governments argue for the 
introduction of some sort of block grant that is determined on a UK basis 
and reflecting what otherwise would have been obtained from the CAP. 
What will also be crucial is the relationship between funding and 
flexibility, which is likely to be uneasy. In the past (for example in relation 
to devolution in Northern Ireland between 1921-1972), a limiting factor 
on differentiation was that if ‘national’ funding was provided through the 
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measures in return, limiting the scope for differentiation. So what is likely 
to be crucial are the financial and budgetary arrangements for any future 
subsidies paid to farmers. These might, as with deficiency payments in 
the period from the 1945 to EU entry, be funded on a UK-wide basis by 
the Treasury, with limited flexibility allowed to the territories. On the 
other hand if any funding for agriculture is controlled by the devolved 
administrations through a general block grant, then they can justify policy 
differences by saying this is how we choose to spend our money. The 
danger here relates to the maintenance of level playing fields under a ‘UK’ 
framework. 
(d) A fourth issue concerns how much flexibility can the 
devolved territories have in relation to the regulatory 
framework, including issues such as agri-environment, 
animal welfare, plant protection, and protected product 
denominations
A likely area of controversy after Brexit will relate to the overall nature of 
the regulatory framework and, crucially, whether and to what extent the 
territories will be able to exploit self-government to vary regulatory 
arrangements. If there is no general UK-wide framework then this could 
work in two directions, reflecting different pressures: some sort of ‘gold 
plating’ - in relation to the environment and animal health for example – 
where some parts of the UK choose to have more stringent regulations - 
and ‘a race to the bottom’ where the territories try to gain competitive 
advantage. Indeed this is precisely why the farmers’ organizations argue 
for a robust UK-wide policy framework.
At the UK level it seems likely that there will be some slackening of rules 
that apply under the CAP - a particular target is the ‘three-crop rule’ (a 
condition for receiving ‘greening payments’ introduced in the 2013 reform 
of the CAP). This is broadly shared by the devolved governments who see 
Brexit as providing an opportunity to re-visit the regulatory framework, 
and especially for the development of a ‘voluntary’ approach in which 
regulation is viewed as a last resort. However there are two limitations on 
variation. First, within the UK, the extent of variation in regulation is likely 
to be limited by concerns about fair competition, and therefore perhaps 
be contained generally within a UK framework. In the past – notably in 
Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1972 – a main limitation on variation 
in agricultural policy was that where ‘national’ subsidies were provided 
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pressure for uniformity was the argument of the Treasury that relatively 
similar regulatory arrangements should also apply in order to protect free 
and fair competition. Second, because of the need to maintain valuable 
export markets there will be pressures to align regulations and standards 
closely to those in force in the EU, and/or there will be limitations 
imposed by WTO rules in cases where these apply directly. 
(e) Are there particular challenges associated with the 
Great Repeal Bill and the devolution of agricultural policy?
It is particularly unclear how the ‘great repeal bill’ will work in relation to 
the repatriation of devolved responsibilities over agriculture. Whether 
such a bill would require the consent of the devolved authorities, or 
whether they will need to pass legislation of their own, is uncertain. The 
Scottish government is clear in its white paper that any decisions about 
devolved matters as a result of the Great Repeal Bill such as in 
agricultural policy (or if the effect of the Bill is to take powers back to 
Westminster) will require the consent of the Scottish parliament under the 
Sewel Convention. Apart from the legal complexities, the main problems 
are likely to be political, especially if the introduction of the Great Repeal 
Bill alters current understandings about the nature and extent of devolved 
powers in agriculture.
3. What impact could the Devolved Administrations’ policies on 
agriculture have on the UK’s trading relations with the EU 
and the world
(a) International trade
There is agreement in the devolved territories that the most important 
implication of Brexit may be its impact on agricultural trade, especially if a 
‘hard Brexit’ means withdrawal from the single market and the striking of 
bilateral trade deals (under WTO rules). In the Brexit documents 
published by the Scottish and Welsh governments for example, 
maintenance of the single market and customs union was identified as the 
core priority. This reflects the importance of export markets to the agri-
food sector (for example around 90 per cent of Welsh food and drink 
production is exported to the EU, including over a third of Welsh lamb), 
and there are worries about the potential introduction of tariffs (and also 
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maintenance of access to the single EU market (including freedom of 
movement and employment) is vital. There is also a fear that agricultural 
interests might be sacrificed in the interests of broader free trade 
agreements, for example covering access to services. Agriculture could be 
seriously affected by the striking of bilateral trade deals with countries 
such as Australia (especially for the Welsh sheepmeat sector), New 
Zealand, Brazil and Argentina.  
A crucial consideration in relation to Brexit is that international trade and 
competition policy are matters that are reserved to the ‘UK’ government, 
but which nonetheless have major implications for the exercise of 
devolved powers. Indeed this issue caused substantial difficulties for the 
Northern Ireland Parliament between 1921 and 1972, especially in areas 
such as marketing. In this respect Brexit is opening up debate about the 
devolution settlement in relation to the distribution of competences. The 
Scottish government for example argues that there should be a 
fundamental reconsideration of the powers of the Scottish parliament, 
which also should be given the power to enter into international 
agreements in areas of devolved responsibility, and also to assume 
responsibility for functions that are currently reserved to Westminster, 
including control over imports and exports and trade negotiations – all of 
which will have substantial relevance for the agri-food sector.
(b)  The Irish border and relations with the Republic of 
Ireland
A particular concern is the implications of Brexit for the inter-relationships 
between the territories of the UK and the Republic of Ireland. This 
concerns, for example not just questions about customs union and the 
free movement of goods and people across the border, but also for 
existing cross-border arrangements such as the all-island strategy for 
animal health. There are worries about the potential adverse 
consequences of any re-introduction of a controlled ‘hard’ border between 
the UK and Ireland, which it is argued could destabilise the whole of the 
political settlement as well as have negative consequences for trade. 
Significant in this picture is the potential negative impact of Brexit on the 
agri-food sector, where trade between the UK and Ireland as a whole is 
important. Already the post-Brexit fall in the value of sterling has caused 
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with the mushroom sector – which is almost totally reliant on the UK 
market – particularly hard hit. In terms of overall trade, over half of all 
exports from Northern Ireland go to the EU, and the Republic of Ireland is 
the main destination for exports and the main source of imports. While 
Northern Ireland is a relatively unimportant market for the Republic, 14 
per cent of Irish goods exports go to the UK as a whole, which also is the 
source of a quarter of Irish imports. In agricultural and processed agri-
food products however, the trade relationships are even more important. 
The Republic of Ireland is the largest destination for UK farm exports, and 
also is the third largest importer of food into the UK. Forty per cent of 
Irish agri-food and drink exports go to the UK, and the Republic is also 
the UK’s largest market for processed food and drink products. Compared 
to other sectors, cross-border trade in food and drinks is high, especially 
in milk and livestock products. A particular problem is that there are 
important integrated food supply chains and distribution patterns that 
criss-cross the frontier, for example in the dairy and meat processing 
industries.
Following the referendum result the Northern Ireland Executive indicated 
that its core concerns were to have trade agreements that are as free as 
possible and to retain the substantial EU funds for the peace process and 
the economy. The Irish government also has expressed concern about the 
implications of Brexit, including in the agri-food sector. While Taoiseach 
Enda Kenny was careful not to intervene directly in the Brexit referendum 
debate, he made it clear that it was impossible to remain silent on an 
issue which impinges so directly on Ireland’s national interests. So the 
initial response of the Irish government after the vote was to describe the 
result as having ‘very significant implications’, especially in relation to the 
economy and trade, Northern Ireland and the peace process, the border 
and the Common Travel Area. Subsequently the Irish government has 
warned on several occasions about the very negative consequences of 
return of a ‘hard border’ that involves the reintroduction of customs posts. 
So for the Irish government the maintenance of an open border and the 
common travel area is a core political imperative in Brexit negotiations. 
The Scottish government also has expressed strong support for the 
maintenance of the ‘invisible border’ between the Republic of Ireland and 
the UK. However while the UK government and Theresa May have 
expressed a desire to take the ‘special circumstances’ of Northern Ireland 
into account, not to return to the ‘borders of the past’, and to keep the 
border as ‘fluid as possible’, there is considerable concern about the 
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potential economic and political consequences if free trade, the Common 
Travel Area and the customs union are not maintained. 
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